Discussion
In this article, I discussed
what I call “the problem of otherness” in dissociative disorder; how much we
recognize each PP’s perception of otherness in other PPs. I discussed that our
general trend as clinicians (and perhaps people in general as well) is not
fully recognizing it, even in this modern era. I attributed this trend to what
has stemmed from the era of Freud-Janet controversy, partly due to the
conceptual ambiguity of the splitting of mind (in double vs. multiple fashions).
Following Freud’s idea, we tend to consider dissociation as defensive and
intentional act, at least when it was initiated, with an understanding that PPs
are not really structurally separated, but internally and dynamically connected
to each other. This makes us believe that each PP is somewhat causative of and responsible
for other PPs decision or behaviors.
If we fully grant the
otherness in this “problem”, it would make us treat each PP as somewhat intact
and wholesome instead of being defective, inefficient, partial and ready to be
integrated with the help of therapeutic aid or environmental support. This view indicates that each PP can be total
and healthy, although often grossly idiosyncratic in terms of their range of
emotional and cognitive tendency and capacity.
The presentation of
neurocognitive hypothetical model is supported by Edelman et al, who makes a
point that (healthy) mind is unitary: each mind is not a mixture of different
subjectivity but single and unique. The most natural way of hypothesizing neural
correlate of DID condition is to postulate simultaneous and multiple existence of
conscious, which was in a sense predicted by Putnam’s discrete model and practically
demonstrated by split brain phenomenon.
Hypothetical model of
DID using the concept of “dynamic core” in its multiple existence connotes that
each dynamic core is basically intact, corresponding to the intactness of each
PP.
