Toward the theory of “Dissociation with capital D” ⑫
His
statement “The patient gone off into his trance is a child indeed” should
be paid special attention. What Ferenzci practically meant was that the child
has an agency in its own right, with his/her emotion, sensation and memory. That
part shows “the
concomitant development of a separate, split off, psychic organization,
personality, or stream of consciousness”(van der Hart,2009).
Ferenczi’s pro-dissociation
stance is most conspicuous in his conceptualization of the "identification of
the aggressor". As Frankel states (Jay Frankel (2002) Exploring Ferenczi's Concept of Identification
with the Aggressor: Its Role in Trauma, Everyday Life, and the Therapeutic
Relationship. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 12:101-139.）Ferenczi’s notion predates that of Anna Freud, although his
publication came much later in English.
Here, I reluctantly quote myself.
・・・Ferenczi’s
concept of identification with the aggressor
Perhaps the notion most relevant to our
discussion of the formation of SPs is Ferenczi’s “identification with the
aggressor.” This notion (hereafter abbreviated as “IWA”) is generally considered
to have been introduced by Anna Freud (1936; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1974, p.
207), who included IWA as one of the defense mechanisms: “Faced with an
external threat (typically represented by a criticism emanating from an
authority), the subject identifies himself with his aggressor. He may do so
either by appropriating the aggression itself, or else by physical or moral
emulation of the aggressor, or again by adopting particular symbols of power by
which the aggressor is designated.” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1974, p. 207)
Perhaps most characteristic of Anna Freud’s conception of IWA is the reversal of the role. Anna Freud thought that the child goes through an initial stage wherein the aggressive relationship is reversed: the aggressor is introjected while the person attacked, criticized, or guilty is projected outwards. It is only afterwards that the aggressiveness turns inwards.
The same perspective was presented by René Spitz (1957), who asserts that IWA is the predominant mechanism in the acquisition of the capacity to say “no.”
These authors stressed the importance of the internalization of aggression, which is first directed toward the children—in order to “use” it, so to speak, as a coping strategy for dealing with the original aggression. It is regarded as a healthy mechanism that a child must acquire to further develop their personal integrity vis-à-vis the external world.
Recently, there have been some views asserting the necessity of attending to Ferenczi’s original notion of IWA, which stresses the rather pathological and traumatic aspect of the situation wherein the IWA is mobilized. One of the proponents of this original notion is Jay Frankel (2002).
He stresses that although many of us attribute this notion to that of Anna Freud (as L & P do, as is mentioned above), Ferenczi’s notion of IWA should be honored for its originality, and his notion was practically very different from that proposed by Anna Freud, which essentially meant that the victim turns the situation around and becomes the aggressor him/herself. “By impersonating the aggressor, assuming his attributes or imitating his aggression, the child transforms himself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat” (A. Freud, 1936, p. 113).
Frankel carefully guides us in exploring Ferenczi’s original meaning of IWA.
Frankel states that Ferenczi introduced the concept of IWA in a paper in 1933 (Ferenczi, 1933), which was three years before Anna Freud’s mentioned of it in her book (1936).
Perhaps most characteristic of Anna Freud’s conception of IWA is the reversal of the role. Anna Freud thought that the child goes through an initial stage wherein the aggressive relationship is reversed: the aggressor is introjected while the person attacked, criticized, or guilty is projected outwards. It is only afterwards that the aggressiveness turns inwards.
The same perspective was presented by René Spitz (1957), who asserts that IWA is the predominant mechanism in the acquisition of the capacity to say “no.”
These authors stressed the importance of the internalization of aggression, which is first directed toward the children—in order to “use” it, so to speak, as a coping strategy for dealing with the original aggression. It is regarded as a healthy mechanism that a child must acquire to further develop their personal integrity vis-à-vis the external world.
Recently, there have been some views asserting the necessity of attending to Ferenczi’s original notion of IWA, which stresses the rather pathological and traumatic aspect of the situation wherein the IWA is mobilized. One of the proponents of this original notion is Jay Frankel (2002).
He stresses that although many of us attribute this notion to that of Anna Freud (as L & P do, as is mentioned above), Ferenczi’s notion of IWA should be honored for its originality, and his notion was practically very different from that proposed by Anna Freud, which essentially meant that the victim turns the situation around and becomes the aggressor him/herself. “By impersonating the aggressor, assuming his attributes or imitating his aggression, the child transforms himself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat” (A. Freud, 1936, p. 113).
Frankel carefully guides us in exploring Ferenczi’s original meaning of IWA.
Frankel states that Ferenczi introduced the concept of IWA in a paper in 1933 (Ferenczi, 1933), which was three years before Anna Freud’s mentioned of it in her book (1936).
One of the
reasons that Ferenczi’s notion did not gain due recognition was the specific
circumstances in which his idea was initially presented. His 1933 paper was
presented at the Weisbaden Congress in September 1932, and published in German
later that year. Unfortunately, it was not translated into English and
published until 1949. Frankel (2002) succinctly summarizes Ferenczi’s ideas
presented in the 1933 paper, as follows.
Exploring the early memories of his adult patients who had been abused as children, Ferenczi (1933) found evidence that children who are terrified by adults who are out of control will “subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor…. The weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defense, but by anxiety-ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor” (pp. 162-163, entire passage italicized in the original). The child “become[s] one” (p. 165) with the attacker. (p. 131)
Given the above background, it is evident that we are practically dealing with two distinct types of IWA: Anna Freud’s and Ferenczi’s original. In the former sense, through IWA a child becomes like the aggressor, whereas in the latter sense, the child subordinates him/herself to the aggressor. However, this begs the question: Why are we discussing two opposite circumstances based on the same mechanism of IWA? In answering this question, Frankel draws on Heinrich Racker’s (1968) notion of two types of countertransference identification, “concordant” and “complementary.”
In concordant countertransference identification, the analyst identifies with the agency (id or superego) that the analysand is also identifying with. In contrast, in complementary countertransference, the analyst identifies with the agency with which the analysand is disidentifying or objectifying. Thus, in an aggressor–victim situation, a child identifies with the aggressive side of the aggressor in concordant identification, whereas in complementary identification, the child would identify with the aggressor’s internal object of the child, which is submissive and victimized.
Frankel stresses, however, that these two types of IWA were hinted at in Ferenczi’s own paper. Ferenczi distinguished two mechanisms: identification and introjection, which are like two sides of the same coin. Identification in Ferenczi’s use of the term means trying to feel what another person feels, essentially by getting into that other person’s head. In contrast, in introjection, one gets an image of someone into one’s own head.
Exploring the early memories of his adult patients who had been abused as children, Ferenczi (1933) found evidence that children who are terrified by adults who are out of control will “subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor…. The weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defense, but by anxiety-ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor” (pp. 162-163, entire passage italicized in the original). The child “become[s] one” (p. 165) with the attacker. (p. 131)
Given the above background, it is evident that we are practically dealing with two distinct types of IWA: Anna Freud’s and Ferenczi’s original. In the former sense, through IWA a child becomes like the aggressor, whereas in the latter sense, the child subordinates him/herself to the aggressor. However, this begs the question: Why are we discussing two opposite circumstances based on the same mechanism of IWA? In answering this question, Frankel draws on Heinrich Racker’s (1968) notion of two types of countertransference identification, “concordant” and “complementary.”
In concordant countertransference identification, the analyst identifies with the agency (id or superego) that the analysand is also identifying with. In contrast, in complementary countertransference, the analyst identifies with the agency with which the analysand is disidentifying or objectifying. Thus, in an aggressor–victim situation, a child identifies with the aggressive side of the aggressor in concordant identification, whereas in complementary identification, the child would identify with the aggressor’s internal object of the child, which is submissive and victimized.
Frankel stresses, however, that these two types of IWA were hinted at in Ferenczi’s own paper. Ferenczi distinguished two mechanisms: identification and introjection, which are like two sides of the same coin. Identification in Ferenczi’s use of the term means trying to feel what another person feels, essentially by getting into that other person’s head. In contrast, in introjection, one gets an image of someone into one’s own head.
