この章もここら辺までは結構しっかりかけていた。
A Review of the
literature
Although the “problem
of otherness” has a great clinical significance, related articles appear to be
rather scarce, due in some part to a theoretical ambiguity about how
dissociative process can be described. In this review of the literature, I
start from the discussion of John O’Neil (2009) who tackled on to this issue
from the standpoint of ambiguity of the term splitting in the literature of psychoanalysis as well as
dissociative disorders.
The concept of splitting as a source of confusion in dealing
with the problem of “otherness”
According to O’Neil,
the notion of splitting, used mainly in psychoanalytic literature roughly
denoting dissociation, could be a source of confusion in the literature. O’Neil
argues that when dissociation is often described as “the splitting of the
mind”, there are two meanings which are frequently confused and
undifferentiated. They are what O’Neil calls division of consciousness and
multiplication of consciousness. The former connotes dissociation of
faculties within one conscious, typically represented by the BASK model
proposed by Bennet G.Braun (1988), while the latter implies the existence of
more than one consciousness. O’Neil points out that this difference has been
overlooked due to the fact that “multiplication and division are present in the
double meanings of both split and double”(p.298). He asserts that while
dissociation is often described as the division
of consciousness, he prefers the connotation of “multiplication of
consciousness” which “better describes dissociative multiplicity” (ibid, p.298).
Hereafter, we refer to this distinction as “splitting as division vs. splitting as multiplication”
in the sense that O’Neil explicated. I propose that the ambiguity of the
meaning of splitting might have been one of the factors deterring our
discussion regarding the “problem of otherness” that I am discussing in this
article.
With this distinction
in mind, we can take a brief look at the history of the theories of
dissociation. By mid-1800s clinicians began to find the splitting of
consciousness in hypnosis and clinical phenomena of hysteria (van der Hart and
Dorahy, 2009). Sigmund Freud, Joseph Breuer and Pierre Janet followed suite in
adopting the notion of dissociation in this sense. Breuer (1895) in the
“Studies of Hysteria” appeared to be content with the notion of dissociation
and the theory of splitting of mind with his notion of “hypnoid state”.
Apparently, Freud supported this view for only a short period of time, until he
recanted in his famous statement. “Strangely enough, I have never in my own
experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria” (Breuer & Freud, 1895). It
appears that Freud was still accepting the notion of the splitting of the mind,
but he was thinking about the splitting as division within the same mind by the
mechanism of repression. In a way, Freud did not accept the splitting of
consciousness in its true sense. He never came to believe that a part of the
mind is broken away and forms another conscious. It should still stay within
his/her mind somewhere, that he named unconscious.
Janet’s view and his “second law of
dissociation”
As for Janet, it
appears that he was using dissociation or splitting of mind in the sense of division, as he thought that splitting
of consciousness is in part, due to the constitutional vulnerability and the
purpose of the therapy was the personality (re)integration and rehabilitation,
which is the resolution of dissociation of the personality (Janet, 1889, 1909,
1911). As I will discuss as follows, however, Janet’s notion of dissociation
was typical of splitting as multiplication.On close examination of
Janet’s theory revealed his belief in dissociation predominantly as multiplication (Janet, 1887, quoted by Dell,
2009). Janet proposed in his 1887 thesis an idea that he calls “second law of
dissociation” and asserts that when dissociation occurs,” the unity of the
primary personality remains unchanged; nothing breaks away, nothing is split
off. Instead, dissociated experiences (…) were always, from the instant of
their occurrence, assigned to, and associated with the second system within.”(Janet,
1887, quoted by Dell, 2009. p.716) His statement is remarkable as he is making
it clear that the consciousness can exist in different parts. The “second
system” (and of course he acknowledges that there can be more than two, (Janet,
1887, quoted by Dell, p. 717.) ) equivalent of what we call PP is emerged afresh as “nothing breaks away.”
Dell (2009) makes a
point that due to this conviction, Janet was totally opposed to Freud’s notion
of unconscious, as Janet believes that all psychological acts require
consciousness (ibid, p.716). While acknowledging Dell’s point, I also believe
that there could have been some similarity of the views between Freud and
Janet. Paradoxically enough, Freud and Janet might have been agreeing with on a
point; a mind does not split into parts, like a block of clay tearing off into
pieces. Freud’s notion of repression did not have an implication of mind being
split into pieces. Janet thought also that “nothing breaks away” from the
original consciousness. For this reason, perhaps, Janet used the term “doubling
of consciousness” (dédoublement de conscience) to describe the existence of a
consciousness and “the second system” in the dissociative process. In Janet’s
mind, dédoublement was used in the sense of multiplicity
instead of division.
It is to note that
Janet’s view of the “second law” became a subject of some criticism. Dell (2009)
maintains that clinical data occasionally confronts Janet’s view, as in some
cases parts of the personal consciousness are actually split off. He gives an
example of a traumatic event in which “some closely related events that had
unquestionably been experienced by the person happens to be taken away into the
second trauma-based consciousness” (or the other PP).
