これまで書いたこと、ちょっと英語にしてみた。
The Problem of “Otherness” in Dissociative Disorder
Treating and interacting with patients with dissociative disorder is a
constant challenge to our belief about human mind that we commonly and
uncritically hold in our daily life. The matter of “otherness” among parts of
personalities is one of them.
A patient of mine, Ms. A, one day talks about her recent experience.
The other day I was driving a car and waiting at a traffic light. When it
turned green, a car ahead of me didn’t respond until a moment later and I heard
a voice on the back of my head yelling “Gee, aren’t you sleeping ? Get
started right away, silly!” I said to myself “My goodness, can’t you be more
patient??” Of course I was driving by myself
and it was B, one of my alters, who yelled.
In this example, it seems obvious that Ms. A has a very different
perception and emotional reaction compared to Mr. For her perspective, Mr.B is
someone else, another subject, if not altogether another person. The question
is whether or not we grant Mr.’s otherness from a perspective of a clinical
observer, such that Ms. A feel understood by us ?
If we are not sure about how we can answer to this question, just think
about another example in a thought experiment.
M.C is at
a traffic light, in a same way that Ms. A did. When a car ahead of her was inattentive
in a same situation, she hears a voice from her back. “Gee, aren’t you goofing off ….” Ms. said “Can’t you be more patient??”
It was her husband on the back seat who yelled.
How many of us are sure that we acknowledge Ms.’s perception of Mr.’s
otherness, on a comparable level as Mr.’s of her husband, which is a real other
person? Perhaps not many. I believe that it is partly due to the fact that we
consider multiple existences of subjects in Ms. A as something pathological,
that we should try to mend by our therapeutic approach. This belief is most
eloquently exemplified by the very definition of DID.
“Dissociative Identity Disorder reflects a failure to integrate various aspects
of identity, memory, and consciousness.” (DSM-5, American Psychiatric
Association, 2013).
The purpose of my paper is to demonstrate that individual with DID’s
perception of their parts of personality as “others” is not altogether pathological
but rather a healthy aspect of their perception, from theoretical as well as
neurocognitive viewpoints.
