Dissociation in the psychoanalytic context - after Freud
Fortunately, many of Freud’s immediate
followers did not abide by Freud's dismissive attitude toward dissociation. Ferenczi,
Fairbairn, Winnicott, among other analysts integrated the idea of dissociation
in their theory, although their way of using the term is greatly different.
The first analyst who made the
stance clearly different from Freud’s was Ferenczi, and his writing is worthy
of close examination. In the 1930s, Ferenczi returned to the place where Freud
conceived his trauma theory before he allegedly abandoned in1897. (Masson, 1984）). In his
1933 paper, Ferenczi made clear that splitting of consciousness of the patients
is due to the trauma in their childhood, basically echoing Breuer’s views. Ferenczi proposed the idea of "identification
of the aggressor" in order to give a theoretical background. This notion is
generally considered to have been introduced by Anna Freud (1936; Laplanche
& Pontalis, 1974, p. 207), who included IWA as one of the defense
mechanisms: Ferenczi’s notion predates that of Anna Freud, although his
publication came much later in English.
Exploring the early memories of his adult patients who had been abused as children, Ferenczi (1933) found evidence that children who are terrified by adults who are out of control will “subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor…. The weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defense, but by anxiety-ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor” (pp. 162-163, entire passage italicized in the original). The child “become[s] one” (p. 165) with the attacker. (p. 131)
Exploring the early memories of his adult patients who had been abused as children, Ferenczi (1933) found evidence that children who are terrified by adults who are out of control will “subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor…. The weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defense, but by anxiety-ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor” (pp. 162-163, entire passage italicized in the original). The child “become[s] one” (p. 165) with the attacker. (p. 131)
It is to note that “Confusion of
Tangues” dealt with the issue of dissociation in a way that Freud would
never approve of, as he loathed the notion of “hypnoid phenomenon” brought
forward by Breuer. The following passage of Frenzci’s paper contains passages
which indicate that he believed in the dissociative process in the sense that
van der Hart would classify as type (2).
After that
the patient started to do everything she was asked to do. We talk a good deal
in analysis of regressions into the infantile, but we do not really
believe to what great extent we are right; we talk a lot about the splitting of the personality, but do not seem sufficiently to
appreciate the depth of these splits. If we keep up our cool, educational
attitude even vis-à-vis an opisthotonic patient, we tear to shreds the last
thread that connects him to us. The patient gone off into his trance is a child indeed who no longer reacts to intellectual explanations, only
perhaps to maternal friendliness; without it he feels lonely and abandoned
in his greatest need, i.e. in the same unbearable situation which at one time led to a splitting of his mind and eventually to his illness; thus it is no wonder that the
patient cannot but repeat now the symptom-formation exactly as he did at the time when
his illness started.(p227). Masson, JM (1984) The Assault on Truth, Basic
Books. Ferenczi, S. (1933/1949 Confusion of tongues between the adult and the
child. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 30, 225-230. In this passage, his statement “The
patient gone off into his trance is a child indeed” should be paid special
attention. What Ferenczi practically meant was that the child has an agency in
its own right, with his/her emotion, sensation and memory. That part shows “the
concomitant development of a separate, split off, psychic organization,
personality, or stream of consciousness”(van der Hart,2009).This next passage also states
clearly Ferenczi’s concept of dissociation where separated (“atomized”)
personality is created in one’s mind.
If the shocks increase in number during the development of the child, the number
and the various kinds of splits in the personality increase
too, and soon it becomes extremely difficult to maintain contact without
confusion with all the fragments each of which behaves as a separate personality yet does not know of even the existence of the others. Eventually it may arrive at a state
which—continuing he picture of fragmentation —one would be justified in calling atomization. (p.229)
Ferenzci’s use of terms, such as
atomization, atutomaton, etc. gives out an evidence that in his mind, what is
dissociated forms its own agency and subjectivity. Thus, as stated earlier, his idea of
dissociation matches van der Hart would classify as type (2).
