Why was Freud so much opposed to the idea of “hypnoid state”? Because the latter presupposes the splitting of the mind, which, according to him was dynamic explanation. Below I quote Freud the last chapter of the “Studies of Hysteria” (Freud, 1895, p.286)
Now both of us, Breuer and I, have repeatedly spoken of two other kinds of hysteria, for which we have introduced the terms ‘hypnoid hysteria’ and ‘retention hysteria’. It was hypnoid hysteria which was the first of all to enter our field of study. I could not, indeed, find a better example of it than Breuer's first case, which stands at the head of our case histories. Breuer has put forward for such cases of hypnoid hysteria a psychical mechanism which is substantially different from that ofdefence by conversion. In his view what happens in hypnoid hysteria is that an idea becomes pathogenic because it has been received during a special psychical state and has from the first remained outside the ego. No psychical force has therefore been required in order to keep it apart from the ego and no resistance need be aroused if we introduce it into the ego with the help of mental activity during somnambulism. And Anna O.'s case history in fact shows no sign of any such resistance.
I regard this distinction as so important that, on the strength of it, I willingly adhere to this hypothesis of there being a hypnoid hysteria. Strangely enough, I have never in my own experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria. Any that I took in hand has turned into a defence hysteria. It is not, indeed, that I have never had to do with symptoms which demonstrably arose during dissociated states of consciousness and were obliged for that reason to remain excluded from the ego. This was sometimes so in my cases as well; but I was able to show afterwards that the so-called hypnoid state owed its separation to the fact that in it a psychical group had come into effect which had previously been split off by defence. In short, I am unable to suppress a suspicion that somewhere or other the roots of hypnoid and defencehysteria come together, and that there the primary factor is defence. But I can say nothing about this. ( Studies of Hysteria,1895, p285., stress added by Okano)
Freud’s stance is clearer in his statements found in the “Psychoneuroses of Defense" (1894).
Let me begin with the change which seems to me to be called for in the theory of the hysterical neurosis.
Since the fine work done by Pierre Janet, Josef Breuer and others, it may be taken as generally recognized that the syndrome of hysteria, so far as it is as yet intelligible, justifies the
assumption of there being a splitting of consciousness, accompanied by the formation of separate psychical groups.1 Opinions are less settled, however, about the origin of this splitting of consciousness and about the part played by this characteristic in the structure of the hysterical neurosis.
According to the theory of Janet (1892-4 and 1893), the splitting of consciousness is a primary feature of the mental change in hysteria. It is based on an innate weakness of the capacity for psychical synthesis, on the narrowness of the ‘field of consciousness (champ de la conscience)’ which, in the form of a psychical stigma, is evidence of the degeneracy of hysterical individuals.
In contradistinction to Janet's view, which seems to me to admit of a great variety of objections, there is the view put forward by Breuer in our joint communication(Breuer and Freud, 1893). According to him, ‘the basis and sine quâ non of hysteria’ is the occurrence of peculiar dream-like states of consciousness with a restricted capacity for association, for which he proposes the name ‘hypnoid states’. In that case, the splitting of consciousness is secondary and acquired; it comes about because the ideas which emerge in hypnoid states are cut off from associative communication with the rest of the content of consciousness.2
I am now in a position to bring forward evidence of two other extreme forms of hysteria in which it is impossible to regard the splitting of consciousness as primary in Janet's sense. In the first of these [two further] forms I was repeatedly able to show that the splitting of the content of consciousness is the result of an act of will on the part of the patient; that is to say, it is initiated by an effort of will whose motive can be specified. By this I do not, of course, mean that the patient intends to bring about a splitting of his consciousness. His intention is a different one; （Freud, “Psychoneuroses of Defense" 1894, p.46, stress added by Okano）.