In this article, I
discussed what I call “the problem of otherness” in dissociative disorder; how
much we validate and recognize each part of personality(PP)’s perception of
otherness in other PPs. Our general trend in this modern era appears not to fully
validate it. I attributed this to our trend stemming from the era of
Freud-Janet controversy, partly due to the conceptual ambiguity of the
splitting of mind in the sense of division
vs. multiplication. It is our general
trend to consider dissociation as defensive and intentional act, at least when
it was initiated, with an understanding that PPs are not structurally
separated, but internally and dynamically connected to each other. This belief
makes us consider that each PP as somewhat causative to and responsible for
other PPs decision or behaviors. The presentation of neurocognitive
hypothetical model is supported by Edelman et al, whose point that (healthy)
mind is unitary: each mind is not a mixture of different subjectivity but
single and unique. The most natural way of hypothesizing neural correlate of
DID condition is to postulate simultaneous and multiple existence of conscious,
which was in a sense predicted by Putnam and practically demonstrated by split
brain phenomenon.